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AVOIDING A DEATH DANCE: ADDING 
STEPS TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
ON THE USE OF FORCE TO IMPROVE 
THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES TO 
FORCE AND PREVENT LIKELY HARMS 
Brian J. Foley* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
he world seems engaged in a death dance.  In the past 
two years we have seen a massive terrorist attack that 
targeted New York City and Washington, D.C., and a response 
by the United States that included invading Afghanistan and 
toppling its government.1  A year and a half later, the U.S. in-
vaded Iraq and toppled its government, based on the argument 
  
 * Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg 
Law Center. J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berke-
ley, A.B., Dartmouth College.  I developed these ideas in a paper presented at 
the International Symposium on Terrorism and Human Rights, sponsored by 
the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, Cairo, Egypt, January 26–28, 
2002; in a draft of this paper to the Faculty of the Rutgers School of Law, 
Camden, on September 30, 2002; and in a paper presented at the conference, 
US Nuclear Policy and Counterproliferation, sponsored by the Center for De-
fense Information and Physicians for Social Responsibility, Washington, D.C., 
February 26, 2003.  I thank the sponsors of and participants at those confer-
ences as well as the Rutgers Law Faculty, especially Ari Afilalo, Kim Ferzan, 
Ann Freedman, Ann Marie Iannone, Darren Latham, Michael Livingston, 
Ruth Anne Robbins, Rand Rosenblatt and Ray Solomon.  Many thanks also go 
to the editors and staff of the Brooklyn Journal of International Law, who saw 
the need for reform of the laws of war and issued a Call for Papers on this 
subject.  I also thank Touro Law Center and Widener University School of 
Law for their support of this project, and Touro Law student Annette Thomp-
son, who helped with research.  I especially thank the following for their re-
view of drafts and earlier versions of this Article, and their encouragement of 
these ideas: Kevin Boyle, Roger Clark, Gail Davidson, Bill Foley, S.J., M.D., 
Stephen Friedman, Judith Gardam, Sean Kealy, Charles Knight, Michael 
Mandel, Harold Piety, Tamara Piety, John Quigley, Andy Strauss, and most 
of all, M.G. Piety. 
1.  Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in Arti-
cle 51 of the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 41, 41–42 (2002); Battle Without 
Borders: The War on Terror, WORLD PRESS REVIEW, at http://www.worldpress.o 
rg/specials/wtc/front2.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2003). 
T
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that Iraq posed a direct threat to neighboring nations and an 
indirect threat to distant nations, since its government could 
potentially supply terrorists with nuclear, biological and chemi-
cal weapons.2 
The wars against Afghanistan and Iraq were either violations 
of international law or represented a modification of that law 
through state practice, thereby making it easier for all nations 
to resort to the use of force.3  Such a modification may be neces-
sary or logical.  The world appears increasingly dangerous, 
given the possibility that terrorist organizations might repeat 
the horrific level of destruction visited upon the U.S. on Sep-
tember 11, 2001, or perhaps inflict even greater damage with 
more destructive weapons.  On the other hand, if violence be-
gets violence, then we may not be moving toward a peaceful 
future but dancing toward the precipice of an abyss of lawless-
ness and violence.  We cannot know for certain whether we are 
setting the stage for a more violent or more peaceful world.  
However, the presumption in the United Nations Charter and 
the customary law of self-defense is against using force.4 
International law controls the resort to and use of force, by ei-
ther the UN or a single nation.  The precise nature of this con-
trol, however, is vague.  This Article implicitly argues for an 
understanding of these laws as a three-step process, a clarifica-
tion that would be a “reform” in and of itself.  The three steps 
are: (1) whether the situation to be addressed falls within the 
category of situations where force is one of the allowable re-
sponses; if so, (2) whether force is a necessary response, that is, 
  
 2. President George W. Bush, Speech On Iraq (Mar. 17, 2003), CBS NEWS, 
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/03/17/iraq/main544377.sh 
tml (last visited Oct. 10, 2003); United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair, 
Address to the Nation (Mar. 20, 2003) BBC NEWS, available at http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/2870581.stm (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).  
 3. Erwin Chemerinsky, Commentary: By Flouting War Laws, U.S. Invites 
Tragedy, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2003, at B13 (providing a succinct look at this 
danger). 
 4. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 51; Alan D. Surchin, Terror and the Law: The 
Unilateral Use of Force and the June 1993 Bombing of Baghdad, 5 DUKE J. 
COMP. INT’L L. 457, 473 (1995); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to 
Terrorism, 63 U.PITT. L. REV. 889 (2002) [hereinafter O’Connell, Lawful Self-
Defense]; Jack Beard, America’s New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense 
Under International Law, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y. 559, 567 (Spring 2002) 
[hereinafter Beard, America’s New War]. 
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whether meaningful alternatives to force exist; and, (3) whether 
the force used as a response complies with the norms of military 
necessity, proportionality and discrimination.  Steps One and 
Two can be described as concerns of the jus ad bellum (the law 
governing the decision of whether to use force).  Step Three con-
tains concerns of the jus in bello (the law regulating how force is 
actually used and how hostilities are conducted).  
This Article proposes to modify the laws concerning the use of 
force by focusing on Steps Two and Three, because these steps 
can serve, prospectively, to prevent the automatic and undisci-
plined use of force in response to a crisis or attack.  That is, 
once decisionmakers have identified a serious problem that 
might be addressed with force (Step One), they still must decide 
whether to use force, as opposed to other means.  Step Two, 
which limits force to when it is “necessary,” implies that a 
search for alternatives is required.  Yet the law provides little 
guidance for such a prospective search.  This Article suggests 
ways that it can.  Of course, it is difficult to “legislate” how 
many options a decisionmaker must consider, how thoroughly a 
decisionmaker must consider them, and whether the decision-
maker has to think up any options outside of traditional ones.  
Nevertheless, to “legislate” such a thinking process is the sub-
ject of this Article.   
Step Three (jus in bello), which controls how force is actually 
used, such as denoting which weapons and targets are legal and 
declaring how civilians and prisoners of war are to be treated 
during hostilities, protects against many of the harms that can 
result.  This Article argues, however, that much of this protec-
tion comes too late — after the shooting starts.5  Indeed, some of 
the “protection” comes only after hostilities end, in the form of 
war crimes tribunals.6  Such tribunals do little for those killed, 
maimed, orphaned, widowed or psychologically damaged by the 
use of force and do nothing to prevent those damages prospec-
  
 5. Judith G. Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 
AM. J. INT’L L. 391, 404  (1993) [hereinafter Gardam, Proportionality and 
Force] (noting that “many of the decisions involving the application of propor-
tionality, “predominately a jus in bello concern,” are “taken at the planning 
stage” of military campaigns).  
 6. Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, A Critical History of the Laws of 
War, 35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 49, 95 (1994).  
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tively.  There may be a deterrent effect,7 but prosecution for war 
crimes is perhaps the exception rather than the rule, and prose-
cution is selective.  Last, enforcement of the jus in bello is often 
left in the hands of the combatants.  Prospective consideration 
of jus in bello concerns, before the shooting starts, in the way 
this Article suggests, could increase international control over 
and participation in these protections. 
This Article explores how such prospective guidance can be 
implemented at the UN as well as on the national level.  This 
Article also explores how, even without a formal change to the 
UN Charter, change could occur as a result of practices and rec-
ommended interactions between the Security Council, General 
Assembly, International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), non-
governmental organizations (“NGO”), and national leaders.  
A. Proactive, “Reforming Attitude” is Necessary for Change 
Three phenomena have prevented significant reform of the 
laws of war, especially the jus ad bellum: (1) the belief that na-
tions’ resort to war is incapable of regulation; (2) the lack of an 
enforcement mechanism in international law; and, (3) the doc-
trines of custom and state practice, which are descriptive tools 
for determining what the law is.  A detailed study of these sub-
jects is beyond the scope of this Article, but a brief discussion 
shows why proactive reform of the laws should be considered 
now.  The first, the belief that war cannot be regulated, can be 
dismissed readily.  Wars are created by human beings, with 
identifiable causes, and as such can be regulated.8  Wars do not 
usually erupt like fistfights but require planning.  Second, un-
der a robust enforcement mechanism, such as an international 
court system (or, in the case of the UN, a highly active Security 
Council), the legality of particular actions would be clarified. 9  
  
 7. M. Cherif Bassiouni,  Accountability for International Crime and Seri-
ous Violations of Fundamental Human Rights: Searching for Peace and 
Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 9, 
18 (1996). 
 8. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE 71 (Oxford 
University Press 2d ed. 1994) (1988). 
 9. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 11–12 
(2000).  After reviewing a draft of this Article, Judith Gardam opined that 
many of the changes I propose would likely have come about if there were an 
enforcement mechanism in international law.   
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Leaders could look to the law as a guide to avoid negative con-
sequences.  Indeed, international law on the use of force would 
likely develop in the same way that law has developed over time 
in the Anglo-American common law system, adapting to 
changed conditions.  In such a system, optimistic, would-be re-
formers might choose not to reform at all, but to wait, believing 
that, over time, the law will change and even improve.  How-
ever, one probably waits in vain for such change where there is 
no enforcement mechanism.  For example, in the past two 
years, the United States has invaded two countries, and the 
Security Council, the organ of the UN charged with primary 
responsibility for the use of force, has made no pronouncement 
on the legality of these wars, despite meeting shortly after each 
incident and issuing Resolutions concerning, inter alia, humani-
tarian aid and provisional government.10  Similarly, the Security 
Council has not remarked on several other uses of force since 
1945, including the Vietnam War and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan; only after seven years did the Council respond to 
the Iraq-Iran War of 1980–88.11   
Instead, the determination of legality has been left to com-
mentators.  This is where the third impediment to reform 
arises.  Commentators often focus on whether the particular 
use of force constitutes state practice or customary law.  A pat-
tern has emerged where a nation uses force, and scholars com-
ment post facto on whether such use of force was legal.12  Be-
  
 10. See S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4761st mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1483 (2003); S.C. Res. 1476, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4743d mtg., U.N. 
Doc. S/RES1476 (2003); S.C. 1472, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4732d mtg., U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1472 (2003); S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4443d mtg., 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (2001); S.C. Res. 1383, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4434th 
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1383 (2001); S.C. Res. 1378, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 
4415th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/1378 (2001). 
 11. PETER MALANCZUK, AKERHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 391 (1997).  The Security Council is not required to act in 
any instance, which has led critics to complain of its “notorious selectiveness.” 
Id. at 427. 
 12. See, e.g., Christopher C . Joyner, Reflections on the Lawfulness of Inva-
sion, 77 AM. J. INT’L. L. 131 (1984) (discussing legality of 1983 U.S. invasion of 
Grenada); Gregory Francis Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An Interna-
tional Legal Analysis, 19 CASE WESTERN RES. J. INT’L L. 177 (1987) (discussing 
legality of 1986 U.S. bombing of Libya); Ved P. Nanda, AGORA: U.S. Forces in 
Panama: Defenders, Aggressors or Human Rights Activists?  84 AM. J. INT’L. L. 
494 (1990) (discussing legality of 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama); John Quig-
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cause state practice and custom are a source of international 
law, commentators will often conclude that the exercise of force 
was legal. 13  The dangers inherent in such a system are obvious.  
A nation that is, so to speak, entrepreneurial in using force 
could thus make each use of force sufficiently different from the 
previous one, and as such, the legality of the action would al-
ways be indeterminate at the time.  For example, the country 
could attack country A for harboring terrorists; attack country 
B for building weapons of mass destruction; attack country C 
for repressing its populace; attack country D for encouraging 
and assisting rebels or terrorists in a neighboring nation; attack 
country E for spreading deadly industrial pollution to neighbor-
ing countries; and so on.  Of course, there may be roadblocks 
along the way to make this slope less slippery, but the potential 
for such entrepreneurialism nevertheless exists. 
Notwithstanding the doctrines described above, there has, of 
course, been reform in international law.  But notably, the ma-
jor reforms have been proactive.  Such was the case with the 
  
ley, The United States and the United Nations in the Persian Gulf War: New 
Order or Disorder? 25 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 1, 23–4 (1992) (discussing legality of 
1991 Gulf War) [hereinafter Quigley, New Order]; Jules Lobel, The Use of 
Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and Afghani-
stan, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 537, 554 (1999) (discussing legality of 1998 U.S. mis-
sile strikes against al Qaeda); Nigel. D. White, The Legality of Bombing in the 
Name of Humanity, 5  J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 27 (2000) (discussing legality 
of 1999 NATO bombing in former Yugoslavia); O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense, 
supra note 4, at 889 (discussing legality of 2001 coalition invasion of Afghani-
stan); John Quigley, The Afghanistan War and Self-Defense, 37 VALPARAISO U. 
L. REV. 541 (2003) (same).  
 13. GRAY, supra note 9, at 119.  
A few of these commentators seem prepared to treat any US action as 
a precedent creating new legal justification for the use of force…The 
lack of effective action against the USA as a sanction confirms them 
in this view.  But the vast majority of other states remain firmly at-
tached to a narrow conception of self-defence. 
Id.; DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 92–97 (noting that the law does not change so 
easily, and that there are indeed instances where the law is simply broken 
instead of refashioned).  Concerning the doctrine of custom and state practice, 
and how it affects the law, see MALANCZUK, supra note 11, at 39–48.  The 
seeming illogic of law-breaking as a source of international law is expressed in 
a comment by former U.S. Attorney General William P. Barr, who opined, 
“Well, as I understand it, what you’re saying is the only way to change inter-
national law is to break it.”  John R. Bolton, Is There Really “Law” in Interna-
tional Affairs?, 10 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 6 (2000).   
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creation of the UN and the International Criminal Court, both 
of which have been called “paradigm-shifting.”14  Regarding the 
use of force, proactivity and a normative approach are crucial 
because, as explained above, without them change appears pos-
sible only if nations actually go ahead and use force.  Moreover, 
proactive reform is necessary given that these laws seek to pre-
vent violence, bloodshed, and misery —“the scourge of war,” as 
the UN Charter Preamble states.15 
B. This Proposal Fills a Gap in the Scholarship 
This Article fills a gap in the scholarship regarding how Steps 
Two and Three of the law on the use of force can be applied to 
limit the use of force and the damage that results.  There is al-
ready significant scholarship with respect to Step One, namely 
the categorization of situations or events to which force is a le-
gal response.  Several commentators argue that the categories 
of “threat to” or “breach of international peace and security,” 
“aggression,” and “armed attack” should be more precisely de-
fined, or expanded, to include, inter alia, humanitarian inter-
vention, anticipatory self-defense, and responses to terrorism.16  
Indeed, a fairly recent proposal to change the jus ad bellum fo-
cuses on categorizing which uses of force should be legal and 
which should be illegal, essentially collapsing what this Article 
argues should be a three-step process into a single step.17  Step 
Two has been the subject of commentary that seeks to water 
down the requirement of a search for alternatives to force, pre-
cisely the opposite of what this Article argues; this commentary 
will be addressed infra, in Section III(A)(3).  The jus in bello, 
the subject of Step Three, has been the focus of intense reform 
  
 14. See Roger S. Clark, Rethinking Aggression as a Crime and Formulating 
Its Elements: The Final Work-Product of the Preparatory Commission for the 
International Criminal Court, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 859, 868 n.31 (2002) (not-
ing that International Criminal Court represents a “paradigm shift”). 
 15. U.N. CHARTER,  pmbl. 
 16. See, e.g., Beard, America’s New War, supra note 4, at 567; Oscar 
Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 
1628, 1633 (1984). 
 17. See ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM 195–202 (1993). 
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and scholarly commentary since World War II.18  Yet, the prob-
lem in timing as described above persists.  The potential of the 
jus ad bellum to prevent harm to the interests governed by the 
jus in bello has been recognized,19 but precisely how it can do so 
has not been explored.20  Its potential remains unfulfilled. 
Moreover, this Article comes at a time when a broader recog-
nition is forming within the UN that the law on the use of force 
needs reform.  The most prominent recent call for reform has 
come from UN Secretary General Koffi Annan, who said that 
the recent U.S.-U.K. war against Iraq, waged without UN ap-
proval or control, should occasion reconsideration of the rules on 
the use of force.21 
There are several reforms that can be made to international 
law concerning the use of force: the composition of the Security 
Council could be changed to reflect current realities; the veto 
power enjoyed by the Security Council’s Permanent Five Mem-
  
 18. See generally Joseph L. Kunz, The Chaotic Status of the Laws of War 
and the Urgent Necessity for Their Revision, 45 AM. J. INT’L. L. 37 (1951); 
Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Laws of War, 29 BRIT. 
Y. B. INT’L. L. 360 (1952); Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitima-
tion of Violence: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, 35 HARV. INT’L L. J. 387, 
412–16 (1994); Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Vio-
lence: A Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT’L L. J. 49, 95 (1994).  
See also Michael N. Schmitt, Bellum Americanum: The U.S. View of Twenty-
First Century War and Its Possible Implications for the Law of Armed Conflict 
19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1051 (1998) (discussing how the jus in bello will be pres-
sured, and ultimately modified, by technological change) [hereinafter Schmitt, 
Bellum].  The primary example of the significant reform of the jus in bello 
since World War II are the Geneva Conventions.  
 19. See Judith Gardam, Legal Restraints on Security Council Military En-
forcement Action, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 285, 301–02 (1996) [hereinafter Gardam, 
Legal Restraints] (questioning the separation of the jus ad bellum and the jus 
in bello and stating, “It is becoming increasingly apparent, however, that to 
rely on the jus in bello to provide real protection to the civilian population in 
times of armed conflict is a failure to acknowledge the far greater potential of 
the jus ad bellum to achieve this goal.”).  
 20. Michael N. Schmitt, The Resort to Force in International Law: Reflec-
tions on Positivist and Contextual Approaches, 37 A. F. L. REV. 105, 107 (1994) 
(“By contrast [to the jus in bello], the jus ad bellum, the law which governs 
resort to force, is relatively unexplored territory.”). 
 21. Dharam Shourie, United Nations in Need of Fundamental Reform, at 
http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/oct/02un.htm.  See also Press Release, Tran-
script of Secretary General Kofi Annan Speech to the General Assembly (Sept. 
23, 2003), UN Doc. SG/SM/8891, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press 
/docs/2003/sgsm8891.doc.htm. 
File: FoleyMacro.doc Created on: 10/19/2003 5:03 PM Last Printed: 11/17/2003 5:32 PM 
2003] AVOIDING A DEATH DANCE 137 
bers could be eliminated;22 and war crimes could be defined 
more clearly, perhaps in the new International Criminal Court.  
Many such changes would be welcomed and should be explored.  
This Article, however, focuses instead on how the law can be 
modified so that it may prospectively guide decisionmakers to 
resort to force less often, by requiring decisionmakers to devise 
and consider alternatives to force, and by requiring decision-
makers proactively to consider the particular harms that a pro-
posed use of force could cause, and to devise ways to avoid or 
limit these harms.  
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND: UNDERSTANDING THE LAW ON THE USE 
OF FORCE (JUS AD BELLUM AND JUS IN BELLO) AS A THREE-
STEP PROCESS 
International law can be read as detailing a three-step proc-
ess regarding the use of force: (1) the conflict must fall within 
one of the categories in which force may be used; (2) there must 
be a search for alternatives to force; and, (3) any use of force 
must be disciplined and limited.  Indeed, much of the reform for 
which this Article argues is merely heuristic: recognizing these 
three steps can help decisionmakers take a prospective, consid-
ered and creative approach to determining whether force should 
be authorized.  What follows is a reading of the UN Charter, 
customary law of self-defense, and agreements such as the Ge-
neva Conventions that reveals this three-step framework. 
A. Step One: Does the Problem to be Solved Fall Within a Cate-
gory Where Force May be a Permissible Response? 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter outlines the Security Coun-
cil’s approach to using force, and it can be read as requiring a 
thinking process.  First, the Security Council must “determine 
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression.”23  Such threats or breaches are undefined by 
the Charter and, presumably, the Security Council has discre-
  
 22. MALANCZUK, supra note 11, at 376-77, (noting the unwillingness of 
permanent members to relinquish their power).  Id. at 430 (discussing possi-
bility of reforming UN structure).  
 23. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. 
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tion in making such a determination.24  Indeed, it has been ar-
gued that the Security Council has no limits in this regard.25  
However, this discretion should not be seen as unbounded, 
given that the Security Council is required to “act in accordance 
with the Purposes and Princples of the United Nations.”26 
Thus, Step One is a categorical one: the Security Council 
must ask if the event or crisis is a “breach of” or threat to inter-
national peace and security,” an “act of aggression,” or an 
“armed attack.”  In some cases the categories are clear.  For ex-
ample, a military invasion of a country would be a “breach of 
international peace and security” and an “armed attack.”27  On 
the other hand, the leader of one nation burning the flag of an-
other nation, and shouting insults at that other nation on tele-
vision, would not fall within such a category, and, as such, 
would not occasion the legal use of force as a response.  And 
then there are gray areas.  Is it an “armed attack” when foreign 
men steer civilian passenger planes into a military headquar-
ters and two privately owned skyscrapers?28  Is the possession of 
chemical or nuclear weapons a “threat to international peace 
and security”?29  Is a government’s repression of its own popu-
lace,30 or widespread ethnic massacres during a civil war,31 or 
  
 24. See id.; O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense, supra note 4, at 905; Schmitt, 
Bellum, supra note 18, at 1070.  
 25. DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 282 (Security Council has “carte blanche” in 
this regard). 
 26. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 2. 
 27. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/660 (1990) (Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait a breach of international peace 
and security). 
 28. Beard, America’s New War, supra note 4, at 567 (arguing that Septem-
ber 11 attacks were “armed attacks” despite that relevant Security Council 
resolutions [1368 and 1373] did not use that term but instead called the at-
tacks “terrorist attacks”). 
 29. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg., U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002) (calling Iraq’s “non-compliance with Council resolu-
tions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range mis-
siles” a threat to international peace and security).   
 30. Such as the situation in Kosovo in 1999, where the Security Council did 
not act. 
 31. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 918, U.N. SCOR, 3377th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/918 
(1994) (declaring the situation in Rwanda “a threat to peace and security in 
the region”).  
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the military coup of a democratically elected government32 a 
“threat to or breach of international peace and security”?  It has 
been suggested that these gray areas are increasingly seen in 
black and white, that is, that the Security Council has broadly 
interpreted its mandate to act under Chapter VII and found 
many of these gray area situations permitting the use of force in 
response.33  
On the other hand, an individual nation is afforded no such 
discretion to use force.34  Nations are required to “confer on the 
Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.”35  Nations are required to set-
tle their disputes “by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security, and justice, are not endan-
gered,”36 and are explicitly required to “refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force against the terri-
torial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Na-
tions.”37   
There is one, limited exception to this rule: self-defense, when 
a nation may defend itself individually or collectively, “if an 
armed attack occurs.”38  However, the nation may defend itself 
only “until the Security Council has taken measures necessary 
to maintain international peace and security.”39  The nation act-
ing in self-defense must act within strict confines.  It may not 
ignore the authority of the Security Council.40  The nation must 
  
 32. MALANCZUK, supra note 11, at 407 (discussing 1994 Security Council 
authorization of force to remove the military junta that had overthrown the 
democratically elected President Aristide of Haiti, but without specific deter-
mination that there had been a breach to international peace and security). 
 33. For a listing of instances that the Security Council has deemed a 
breach or threat of international peace and security, see Michael Schmitt, The 
Sixteenth Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law: Bellum Ameri-
canum Revisited: U.S. Security Strategy and the Jus ad Bellum, 176 MIL. L. 
REV. 364, 405–07 (2003) (arguing that the Security Council’s discretion to 
label situations a threat and fashion an appropriate response has been exer-
cised quite creatively) [hereinafter Schmitt, Bellum Americanum Revisited]. 
 34. U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1; id. at art. 2, para. 3–4.  
 35. Id. art. 24, para. 1. 
 36. Id. art. 2, para. 3. 
 37. Id. art. 2, para. 4. 
 38. Id. art. 51. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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immediately report the measures being taken to the Security 
Council.41  Still, the nation itself is often the entity that must 
determine whether an “armed attack” has occurred such that 
the nation may defend itself, presumably with force.  Usually, 
this determination is not difficult.42  
Further discussion of Step One (determining whether an 
event falls within a category where force is a permissible re-
sponse) is beyond the scope of this Article.  Perhaps, it would be 
counterproductive to attempt to limit the Security Council’s 
ability to address a problem or crisis, because the Security 
Council has a wide range of possible solutions, not limited to 
military force, to bring to bear on some of the most pressing cri-
ses of the day.43 
B. Step Two: Is Force Necessary? The Search for Alternatives 
Once inside a category where force is a permissible response, 
alternatives to force must be explored.  
  
 41. Id. 
 42. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. 
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), at para. 195. (“In case of individual self-
defense, the exercise of this right is subject to the State concerned having 
been the victim of an armed attack…There appears now to be general agree-
ment on the nature of the acts which can be treated as constituting armed 
attack…”).  But see GRAY, supra note 9, at 96 (noting “there are disagreements 
as to what constitutes an armed attack…[because] of cross-border activity by 
irregular forces…[and] of the special characteristics of particular weapons”). 
 43. THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST 
THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 44 (2002) (The Security Council’s expansive 
view of threats to or breaches of international peace and security to include 
crises that are arguably national, not international, has not come about  
fraudulently or cynically.  Rather, the meaning of ‘threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, and act of aggression’ is gradually being 
redefined experientially and situationally … the global system is re-
sponding, tentatively and flexibly, through ad hoc actions rather than 
by systematic implementation, to new facts and threats that are rede-
fining the threshold of what is seen to constitute a threat to peace, 
requiring a powerful collective response.  
Id.  
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1. The UN Charter Requires the Security Council 
to Search for Alternatives to Force 
Throughout the UN Charter articles that address the use of 
force by the Security Council, such force is limited to when it is 
“necessary.”  The structure of the Charter as it pertains to the 
Security Council presents a number of hurdles which must be 
overcome before force can be used. 
Article 41 states that, in dealing with threats to peace and se-
curity:  
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving 
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its 
decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Na-
tions to apply such measures.  These may include complete or 
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, 
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, 
and the severance of  diplomatic relations.44   
The following Article 42 states: 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided 
for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be in-
adequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as 
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace 
and security.  Such action may include demonstrations, block-
ade, and other operations by air, sea or land forces of Members 
of the United Nations.45 
Article 42 requires careful, thorough consideration of — if not 
actual attempts to implement — the means set forth in Article 
41, which can be broadly described as both economic and politi-
cal sanctions.  Military forces can be used “as may be neces-
sary,” but those uses should at first be non-violent, for example 
“demonstrations” and/or “blockade[s].”46  Actual violence ap-
  
 44. U.N. CHARTER art. 41. 
 45. U.N. CHARTER art. 42. 
 46. Of course, blockades might need to be enforced with occasional, limited 
violence, and longstanding and comprehensive blockades can wreak enormous 
damage, perhaps greater damage in some cases than that caused by the use of 
armed force. See Joy Gordon, Cool War: Economic Sanctions as a Weapon of 
Mass Destruction, HARPER’S MAGAZINE, Nov. 2002, at 43 (describing effects of 
UN sanctions on Iraq after the Gulf War and stating that 500,000 Iraqi chil-
dren under age five are estimated to have died as a result).  See also Max Ro-
denbeck, The Occupation, 50 N. Y. REV. OF BOOKS 14 n.2, Aug. 14, 2003 (“The 
very lowest of many estimates of child deaths between 1990 and 2000, caused 
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pears to fall under the perhaps euphemistic “other operations,” 
as defined in Article 42. 
Chapter VI, “The Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” supports 
the argument that the Security Council must try peaceful 
means before resorting to force, at least when dealing with cog-
nizable, international disputes.47  “The parties to any dispute, 
the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance 
of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a 
resolution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbi-
tration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or ar-
rangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”48  The 
Security Council “shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the 
parties to settle their dispute by such means.”49  Under this 
Chapter, the Security Council is also able to investigate inter-
national disputes at its own behest,50 and nations themselves 
may bring disputes to the Security Council.51  However, the text 
of the Charter is unclear regarding whether these steps, and 
specifically the dispute resolution steps set forth in Chapter VI, 
must occur before the consideration of military force in Chapter 
VII.  Still, it seems reasonable to assume that they must occur 
first, given that many disputes could be resolved in this man-
ner.52  Nevertheless, the Charter’s suggestion of particular 
methods of peaceful dispute resolution adds weight to the ar-
  
by the rise in mortality rates from pre-Gulf War levels, is 100,000”) (citing 
Iraq Sanctions: Humanitarian Implications and Options for the Future, 
GLOBAL POLICY FORUM (New York), Aug. 6, 2002)).   
 47. U.N. CHARTER Ch. VI.  Indeed, the UN Charter’s drafters’ placing this 
chapter before Chapter VII, which governs the use of force, adds weight to this 
argument. 
 48. U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1. 
 49. U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 2. 
 50. See U.N. CHARTER art. 34. 
 51. U.N. CHARTER art. 35. 
 52. That the Chapter VI methods are to be tried before force is authorized 
is set forth in a pronouncement by the President of the Security Council on 
May 13, 2003 that,  
The Security Council reiterates its commitment to make a wider and 
effective use of the procedures and means enshrined in the provisions 
of the Charter of the Untied Nations on the pacific settlement of dis-
putes, particularly Articles 33–38 (Chapter VI), as one of the essen-
tial components of its work to promote and maintain international 
peace and security. 
U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4753d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2003/5 (2003). 
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gument that a meaningful search for alternatives is a required 
step. 
2. The Customary Law of Self-Defense Requires Individual 
Nations to Search for Alternatives to Force 
The Charter provides no specific guidance on what measures 
a nation under armed attack may take.  For that, nations turn 
to the customary rule of self-defense, known as the Caroline 
Rule: “There must be a ‘necessity of self-defense, instant, over-
whelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for delib-
eration’ and the action taken must not be ‘unreasonable or ex-
cessive,’ and it must be ‘limited by that necessity, and kept 
clearly within it.’”53  Thus, force is authorized only where there 
are no alternatives.54  Implicit in the Caroline rule is the notion 
that, if possible, a decisionmaker would have to try any cogni-
zable alternatives unless “they clearly would be futile.”55  States 
must engage in this effort in good faith.56 
  
 53. MALANCZUK, supra note 11, at 314 (quoting Daniel Webster) (emphasis 
added).  This rule was penned by U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster in an 
exchange of diplomatic papers concerning an 1837 incident where British 
forces crossed the border from Canada and destroyed the Caroline, an Ameri-
can ship, in a New York port, because it was being used to assist Canadian 
rebels against Great Britain.  The rule is widely regarded as the “classic” rule 
on self-defense in international law.  Id.  Of course, there is some controversy 
over whether the Caroline standard is truly customary international law.  For 
a good summary of this discussion, see Michael C. Bonafede, Here, There, and 
Everywhere: Assessing the Proportionality Doctrine and U.S. Uses of Force in 
Response to Terrorism After the September 11 Attacks, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 
155, 167 n.57 (2002) (concluding that the Caroline rule is the customary stan-
dard).  See also GRAY, supra note 9, at 105–06.  
As part of the basic core of self-defence all states agree that self-
defence must be necessary and proportionate…irrespective of the 
status of the Caroline incident as a precedent, necessity and propor-
tionality have played a crucial role in state justification of the use of 
force in self-defence and in international response. 
Id. 
 54. DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 202. 
 55. Id. (quoting Schachter, supra note 16, at 1635).  
 56. Id. 
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C. Step Three: Can the Harms Caused by the Use of Force be 
Prevented or Limited? 
Once resorted to, force must be used in accordance with the 
norms of customary international humanitarian law of war, 
also known as the jus in bello.57  These norms consist of neces-
sity, proportionality, and discrimination58 and apply to the Se-
curity Council, nations acting under its authorization, and na-
tions acting in self-defense.59 
The term “necessity” here means military necessity, that is, 
force required to accomplish a reasonable military goal.60  “Pro-
portionality” limits belligerents in the means that they may use 
and the extent of the damage which they may cause.61  “Dis-
crimination” requires distinguishing between combatants and 
civilians in target selection.62  These rules apply regardless of 
the legality of the war itself.63  The jus in bello is concerned with 
limiting the harms of war, and covers issues such as protecting 
civilians,64 protecting the environment,65 protecting cultural 
  
 57. O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense, supra note 4, at 902–03.   
 58. Id. 
 59. See, e.g., Gardam, Legal Restraints, supra note 19, at 312 (applying 
necessity and proportionality “to the emerging new system of forceful actions 
involving the Security Council are [sic] not only appropriate but warranted by 
elementary considerations of humanity”); O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense, 
supra note 4, at 905. 
 60. O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense, supra note 4, at 903 (citing W. Michael 
Reisman and Douglas L. Stevick, The Applicability of International Law 
Standards in United Nations Economic Sanctions Programmes, 9  EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 86, 94 (1998)).  
 61. Gardam, Proportionality and Force, supra note 5, at 391.   
 62. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protections of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Proto-
col I), Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978), art. 51, 
para. 4 [hereinafter Protocol I].  
 63. See MALANCZUK, supra note 11, at 306 (calling this a “recognized prin-
ciple” of international law).  
 64. See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 45–58.  
 65. See, e.g., id. art. 55.  
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treasures,66 protecting prisoners-of-war67 and prohibiting certain 
types of weapons.68  
III. LEGAL REFORM OF STEP TWO (SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES 
TO FORCE) AND STEP THREE (PREVENTING AND LIMITING 
HARM) 
Steps Two and Three fail to guide decisionmakers in the 
search for alternatives to force and ways to prevent or limit the 
harms of force.  This section shows how the law fails to guide 
such consideration and then proposes specific ways that the law 
could be reformed so that it would provide such guidance, first 
in Step Two and then in Step Three. 
A. Reforming Step Two, the Search for Alternatives to Force 
This section shows the lack of guidance for the Security 
Council and individual nations in seeking alternatives to force.  
It then addresses how current practice and scholarship appear 
to be limiting, if not eliminating, this required search.  The sec-
tion concludes by offering a set of specific methods that deci-
sionmakers can use to carry out the search for alternatives to 
force. 
1. Problem: Lack of Guidance for Security Council’s 
Search for Alternatives 
Based on the discussion above, this much is clear: the UN 
Charter limits the use of force to instances where it is necessary 
and encourages the use of pacific means to settle disputes; such 
settlements can include participation by Member Nations, the 
Security Council, the UN General Assembly and the ICJ.69  Yet, 
questions linger: Must all of the methods of dispute settlement 
enumerated in Article 33 be tried?  If so, are they the only ones 
that must be tried?  How vigorously must they be tried?  How 
  
 66. See, e.g., id. art. 53.  
 67. See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 44; Geneva Convention Relating 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135.   
 68. See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Produc-
tion, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.  
 69. See generally U.N. CHARTER Ch. VI, “Pacific Settlement of Disputes.” 
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thoroughly must a search for alternatives to force be conducted?  
What standard applies to this search and the decision of 
whether to apply its results, a “reasonable person” standard 
(itself often vague, as lawyers know well), or something else?70  
These questions are unanswered in the law of war; indeed, they 
are not even explicitly posed.71  Yet, these questions go to the 
heart of the thinking process about when force may be used, a 
thinking process that the law should guide. 
The Security Council decides when force is necessary, but 
there are no formal rules, procedures or proceedings to guide 
the search for other means, or to determine after the fact 
whether other means could have been used.72  If the Security 
Council delegates control over armed forces to a nation, or coali-
tion of nations, what level of oversight must it maintain?  Must 
the nations to whom the use of force has been delegated con-
tinue to search for alternatives to combat?  The law provides 
  
 70. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY 
STATES 434 (Oxford University Press 1968) (1963) (using term “reasonably 
necessary” in discussing necessity element of self-defense). 
 71. Nor are these issues addressed fully in the Just War standard, which 
permits force only as a “last resort.”  NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, 
THE HARVEST OF JUSTICE IS SOWN IN PEACE 5–6 (1993) (“Last Resort: force may 
be used only after all peaceful alternatives have been seriously tried and ex-
hausted.”).  That force may be used only as a “last resort” is akin to the inter-
national law concept of necessity.  Michael J. Matheson, Conference, Just War 
and Humanitarian Intervention: Comment on the Grotius Lecture By Professor 
Jean Bethke Elshtain, 17 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 27–28 (2001).  Notably, there is 
a lack of clarity over how a decisionmaker determines when force is a “last 
resort.”  See George Weigel, The Just War Tradition and the World After Sep-
tember 11, Pope John XXIII Lecture, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 689, 712–13 (2002) 
(arguing that “last resort” must not be read “mechanistically” to require try-
ing, and coming to the end of, a series of non-violent options before force may 
be used but instead that force is permitted, “where there is plausible reason to 
believe that non-military actions are unavailable or unavailing”).  There ap-
pears to be little guidance for the search for non-violent actions, a lack that 
carries into at least one recent proposal to change Just War theory.  See, e.g., 
PETER S. TEMES, THE JUST WAR: AN AMERICAN REFLECTION ON THE MORALITY OF 
WAR IN OUR TIME 168 (2003) (declaring that the “principle of last resort is 
pointedly not among the criteria that I suggest we reaffirm…[because] what 
nations do instead of war — blockades, propaganda campaigns, and restric-
tions on trade — often create terrible harm among an enemy nation’s civilians 
while leaving the military and political leadership intact.”).  Temes’ argument 
ignores the possibility of options beyond his description of “what nations do 
instead of war.”  
 72. U.N. CHARTER art. 42, para. 1.  
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little guidance and thus misses an opportunity to protect 
against the harms that arise from the use of armed force.73 
2. Problem: Lack of Guidance for Individual Nations to 
Consider Alternatives to Force for Self-Defense 
The same questions regarding the Security Council’s deter-
mination of necessity arise when individual nations consider 
using force in self-defense.  What “other means” must be tried, 
and how diligently must decisionmakers try them?  If nations 
must try non-violent means unless they would prove futile,74 
how is such futility proved?  Self-defense requires that the na-
tion has no time to do anything other than use force.75  This is 
understandable if an attack is in progress, but can the assertion 
be made that after suffering an armed attack, a nation may ex-
ercise the right to defend itself from further possible attacks? 76  
Can this nation then take weeks or months to plan its military 
campaign?77  Can a nation that has not been attacked use force 
in anticipation of an attack?78  To what degree must other op-
tions be tried first? 
Furthermore, when a single nation acts unilaterally, the need 
for control over the use of force seems greater than when the 
Security Council uses force, because the search for solutions is 
likely truncated by lack of input and perspective.  The decision-
making group in such cases is likely small and in many ways 
homogeneous, and there is a risk that it might engage in 
“groupthink.”79  After an attack, decisionmakers might be un-
  
 73. Of course, the Security Council itself can bolster its procedures to en-
sure that force is used only as a last resort.  Notably, in the Resolution the 
Security Council issued concerning Iraq on November 8, 2002, the Council 
stated that should Iraq fail to comply with the new demands for weapons in-
spections, the Council would convene to decide what measures to take; there 
would be no automatic use of force.  S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 
4644th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441, at para. 12 (2002).  
 74. See supra note 55. 
 75. See Bonafede, supra note 53, at 170.   
 76. MALANCZUK, supra note 11, at 311–14 (describing the controversy over 
anticipatory self-defense). 
 77. See Bonafede, supra note 53, at 170 (noting “considerable dispute” over 
how long this right to use force in self-defense lasts). 
 78. MALANCZUK, supra note 11, at 311–14.  See supra note 76. 
 79. RICHARD L. JOHANNESEN, ETHICS IN HUMAN COMMUNICATION 154 (5th 
ed. 2002) (“‘Groupthink’ is the collective label used by social psychologist Ir-
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able to convene or communicate with one another, or unable to 
think clearly if the attack was surprising or shocking.  The deci-
sionmakers may be influenced by political concerns, such as 
public demands for revenge, or the fear that if they take a quiet, 
behind-the-scenes approach, they will appear indecisive or pas-
sive. 
3. Problem — and a Brief Comment: The Required Search for 
Alternatives is Not Carried Out in Practice, and Some  
Commentators Argue for its Elimination 
Step Two (the search for alternatives to force), appears to be 
skipped in practice.  For example, the U.S.-led coalition waged 
the 1991 Gulf War under authority of Security Council Resolu-
tion 678, which authorized “all necessary means” to eject Iraqi 
troops from Kuwait.80  Force was used, but there was never an 
explicit finding by the Security Council that military force was 
necessary.81  It has been noted that the inclusion of the phrase 
“all necessary means” in the resolution was understood to au-
thorize the use of force.82  Arguably, this eliding of a search for 
alternatives violated Article 42,83 but the fact remains that nei-
  
ving Janis to describe characteristics of small groups whose process of prob-
lem solving and policy determination typically result in ineffectiveness, low 
quality decisions, and failure to obtain objectives.”). 
 80. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., at para. 2, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/678 (1990). 
 81. Quigley, New Order, supra note 12, at 23–24.  
 82. GRAY, supra note 9, at 153 (“It is clear from the Security Council de-
bates that this formula was understood to mean the use of force.”); Quigley, 
New Order, supra note 12, at 3–4 n.14 (same, citing worldwide news accounts 
of deliberations). 
 83. Quigley, New Order, supra note 12, at 23–24.  
In failing to call for military force in explicit terms, the Council 
played loose with the Article 42 requirement of an express finding of 
the need for military force…For the state that is the object of such ac-
tion, the consequences can obviously be devastating.  If the Council is 
to take such action, it must address it directly and decide explicitly 
that it is necessary.  It may not conceal such a momentous decision in 
metaphorical language.  Stipulating that states might take ‘all neces-
sary means’ is too imprecise an authorization for war. 
Id. But see DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 291, 295  (arguing that the 1991 Gulf 
War was authorized as collective self-defense under Article 51 and that Article 
42 has never been invoked by the Security Council).  Nevertheless, if the coali-
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ther that article nor the rest of the UN Charter is clear on how 
express the finding of “necessity” must be, how the Security 
Council is to arrive at this finding, or how the Council is to 
show that the finding was made.84  Indeed, there is a danger 
that the word “necessary” may be taking on a talismanic role, 
devoid of its usual meaning.  That is, the Security Council’s 
conclusion that a state may take “all necessary means” may be 
seen as approval for using force — rather than requiring the 
search for and exhaustion of alternatives implied by the word 
“necessary.” 85  
Some international law commentators have suggested elimi-
nating the requirement that force be used only when “neces-
sary” in the struggle against terrorism, to give nations, espe-
cially the U.S., an expanded right to use force internationally.86  
  
tion was acting under Article 51, its use of force would be limited by necessity 
and proportionality.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 84. Malaysia complained that Resolution 678 contained no requirement 
that the Security Council actually permit force.  Quigley, New Order, supra 
note 12, at 24–25. 
 85. GRAY, supra note 9, at 153 (discussing use of “necessary” in Resolution 
678 and noting, “The same (or similar) euphemistic formula has been used in 
almost all of the subsequent [Security Council] resolutions authorizing the use 
of force by states.”). 
 86. Beard, America’s New War, supra note 4, at 585–86 (2002).  Beard sim-
ply skips over any requirement of necessity and dismisses the Caroline rule — 
stated supra, at Part II.B.2 — by saying, “some writers are fond of citing [the 
Caroline rule].”  Beard also adds that “[s]uch a strict and self-defeating ver-
sion of necessity expansively based on the Caroline test does not appear to be 
consistent with the right of self-defense under customary international law 
and has been vigorously opposed by a number of writers, particularly in the 
context of fighting terrorism.”  Id.  See also, Alberto Coll, The Legal and Moral 
Adequacy of Military Responses to Terrorism, 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 297, 302 
(1987) (arguing that the Caroline standard should not apply to terrorist 
threats); Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of ‘Armed Attack’ in 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 41, 50 n.57 (2002) (“Ad-
dressing the customary international law constraints relating to necessity and 
proportionality is outside the scope of this Essay.”).  But the Author appears 
to extinguish the requirement of necessity when asking, 
Can the United States possibly be expected not to respond to the 
source of such actions through resort to proportionate military force?  
While the desire to minimize the trans-boundary use of military force 
is central to contemporary world order, international rules that pre-
clude a state from responding forcibly to extraordinary threats to its 
fundamental security interests – indeed, perhaps when ‘the very sur-
vival of a State would be at stake’ – are destined not to endure. 
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To allow for this expansion is illogical, because the goal for 
which force is used should not alone dictate whether force can 
be used.  One terrorist target might be dealt with more effec-
tively with force than another.  For example, force might be ef-
fective against a terrorist training camp, yet ineffective, or even 
counterproductive, if used against a nation where terrorists are 
known to live among unwitting or subjugated civilians, or 
among civilians who share their political views.  So legalizing 
the use of force against “terrorists” or “terrorism” is inappropri-
ate, because not only might force be unnecessary, but it could 
actually exacerbate the situation by breeding more terrorism.  
Terrorists might fight back, but not against the soldiers who are 
destroying their camps.  They (or their allies, family or friends) 
might plant bombs in the capital of the country that dispatched 
troops to destroy the camps.87  In any given case, there may well 
be other, more effective, and less destructive, options.88  Catego-
  
Id.  Advisory Opinion 95, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
1996 I.C.J. 226, 266 (July 8)); William V. O’Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and 
Self-Defense in Counterterror Operations, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 421, 471 (1990) 
(arguing that with the advent of terrorism, particularly in the context of Is-
rael’s war with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the “interpretation of 
necessity is very different from that in a singular incident along the U.S.-
Canadian border”); Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and the National 
Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89, 96–97 (1989) (Caroline rule “exaggerates the test 
of necessity in a situation where the issue was dicta… [and] when war was 
still a permissible option for states that had actually been attacked”). 
 87. The efficacy of military force against terrorism has been questioned, 
recently by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. World Leaders Meet in NY for 
Counterterrorism Conference, CHANNEL NEWSASIA, Sept. 23, 2003. 
We delude ourselves if we think that military force alone can defeat 
terrorism.  It may sometimes be necessary to use force to counter ter-
rorist groups but we need to do much more than that if terrorism is to 
be stopped.  Terrorists thrive on despair.  They may gain recruits or 
supporters where peaceful and legitimate ways of redressing a griev-
ance do not exist. 
Id. Also, it appears that the U.S. military action in Afghanistan has not suc-
ceeded in defeating or meaningfully weakening Al Qaeda.  See e.g., Faye Bow-
ers, Al Qaeda May be Rebuilding, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 5, 2003, 
LEXIS-NEXIS Library; David Johnston, C.I.A. Puts Risk of Terror Strike at 
9/11 Levels, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2002, at A1.  
 88. For a creative, wide-ranging, general list of ways to combat terrorism, 
see United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, A Classifi-
cation of Counter-Terrorism Measures, available at http://www.undcp.org/terr 
orism_measures.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2003).  
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rization risks that decisionmakers will focus on the wrong ques-
tions, diverting inquiry from alternatives to using force or the 
effectiveness of using force.  For example, instead of asking, 
“Are the people we want to kill ‘terrorists’?,” decisionmakers 
should ask, “How can we accomplish this goal (e.g., defeating 
terrorists, preventing genocide, etc.) without using force?”  The 
latter question may well lead to different, and better, answers.  
Indeed, the arguments that legal strictures on use of force 
should be loosened to deal with terrorism show why these stric-
tures need to be kept tight, especially during crises, where emo-
tions can outrun common sense and clear thinking.  
There is no foundation in law, either, for loosening the neces-
sity requirement in dealing with terrorism.  Notably, there is no 
agreed-upon definition of terrorism in international law.89  
Therefore, to allow nations to use force against terrorists would 
place too much discretion in the hands of national leaders in an 
area of law that seeks to limit such discretion; under the UN 
Charter, nations pledge to place primary control over the use of 
force in the Security Council.90  It would not necessarily reduce 
terrorism, but it would almost certainly result in an overall in-
crease in the use of force, and its attendant miseries, which 
would contravene the UN Charter values of peace and secu-
rity.91  Furthermore, eliminating the necessity requirement here 
  
 89. Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of 
Military Force, 18 WIS. INT’L L. J. 145, 181 (2000) (nothing that there is no 
definition of “terrorism” in international law). 
 90. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1.  It is likely that ignoring necessity as a 
legal requirement could simply be aggressive “lawyering” on behalf of the U.S.  
This explanation cannot be readily dismissed when the commentators are 
U.S. government officials.  For example, Jack Beard, when he wrote his article 
cited supra note 4, was Associate Deputy General Counsel (International Af-
fairs), U.S. Department of Defense; Abraham D. Sofaer, cited supra note 86, 
was a Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State from 1985–1990; and 
Alberto R. Coll, cited supra note 86, was Secretary of the Navy Senior Re-
search Fellow, U.S. Naval War College.   
 91. See U.N. CHARTER pmbl.  See also W. Michael Reisman, Criteria for the 
Lawful Use of Force in International Law, 10 YALE J. INT’L L. 279 (1985).  Pro-
fessor Riesman sees the danger that such categorization poses for UN Charter 
values.  He lists nine categories where there appears to be “varying support 
for unilateral uses of force,” but cautions, “[m]erely locating an individual use 
of force in a particular category does not mean that it is lawful.”  Id. at 281–
82.  Professor Reisman suggests using as a guiding principle the question, 
“Will a particular use of force, whatever its justification otherwise, enhance or 
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is an avoidance of law, in the sense of due process, as such ac-
tion appears partially grounded in a desire to punish terror-
ists.92  Whenever possible, terrorists should be dealt with 
through the existing legal system, national or international.93   
This categorical approach ultimately amounts to an attempt 
to use the ends to justify the means.94  And, in the international 
law concerning the use of force, the means matter.  If a goal can 
be accomplished without the use of force, then force should not 
be used.  The inquiry into non-violent means is thus a crucial 
component of this area of law, and the law should give more, 
not less, guidance for it.  It is to such a reform that this Article 
now turns. 
4. A Solution: Requiring Decisionmakers to Engage in 
Thinking Techniques that Can Improve the Search for 
Alternatives to Force 
The interest of this Article lies in the thinking and question-
ing that go to the heart of the decision-making process regard-
ing the necessity of force in a particular instance, questions that 
can lead to reasonable alternatives to force and prevent its use 
in the first place.  As a norm, some search for alternatives must 
be undertaken, and that search must be conducted with creativ-
ity and with a good faith effort to avoid the use of force, not to 
seek justification for it.   
An initial difficulty is defining “good faith” and “creativity” in 
this instance.  This difficulty can be overcome, at least in part, 
by recognizing that the search for other means is obligatory, 
and that it is the embodiment of the purposes and principles of 
the UN Charter to avoid war.95  The difficulty may also be over-
  
undermine world order?”  Id. at 282.  This Article suggests specific criteria 
along lines similar to Professor Reisman’s guiding principle, as well as ways to 
guide decisionmakers to discover alternatives to force.  See infra III.A.4., 
III.B.2. 
 92. See, e.g., Coll, supra note 86, at 299 (“There are three general purposes 
behind military responses to terrorism: long-term deterrence, short-term pre-
vention, and punishment.”). 
 93. See O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense, supra note 4, at 904–06.   
 94. See Judith G. Gardam, Noncombatant Immunity and the Gulf Conflict, 
32 VA J. INT’L L. 813, 836 (1992) [hereinafter Gardam, Noncombatant Immu-
nity]. 
 95. U.N. CHARTER, pmbl. 
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come by requiring strict adherence to the capabilities and tools 
that already exist in the UN to help resolve disputes.96  These 
tools could also be improved, and disciplines and practices such 
as conflict resolution, conflict prevention and preventive diplo-
macy could be made the rule instead of the exception.97  These 
tools can work, if tried.98 
Another improvement would be to require decisionmakers to 
follow specific guidelines or answer specific questions that help 
them find and consider alternatives, as well as requiring deci-
sionmakers to explain why particular alternatives were not, or 
are not being, tried.  In the UN Security Council, for example, 
committees could be formed to seek alternatives to the use of 
force, perhaps in consultation with appropriate experts.  Such 
committees could be required to conduct this search before any 
actual use of force is authorized.  In times of peace, such com-
mittees could be encouraged to address hypothetical crises for 
the purpose of creating documents, studies, or commentary to 
the laws of war that would provide examples that can be turned 
to, examined, and perhaps applied in times of conflict.    
The Security Council should “judicialize”99 its decisionma 
king, i.e., show the thinking behind its conclusions regarding 
the use of force.  The Security Council could be required to pre-
pare a document on the necessity of the use of force in a particu-
lar instance.100  Legitimate use of force may be proven by show-
  
 96. For a clear explanation of this and other methods, see KEITH SUTER, 
ALTERNATIVE TO WAR: THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 
(1st ed. 1986).  
 97. See LOUIS B. SOHN, BROADENING THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN 
PREVENTING, MITIGATING OR ENDING INTERNATIONAL OR INTERNAL CONFLICTS 
THAT THREATEN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 5–6 (Int’l R. of L. Center 
Occasional Papers, 2d Ser., No. 1, 1997).  
 98. See MALANCZUK, supra note 11, at 430 (“In the final analysis, the effec-
tiveness of the United Nations depends on the willingness of member states to 
cooperate, and no amount of changes in the structure of the United Nations 
will guarantee its effectiveness” without cooperation.).  
 99. I am grateful to Professor Kevin Boyle of the University of Essex for 
using this term to describe my presentation of this idea at the International 
Symposium on Terrorism and Human Rights, sponsored by the Cairo Insti-
tute for Human Rights Studies, Cairo, Egypt, January 26–28, 2002.  At that 
time Professor Boyle was serving as Senior Adviser to the UN High Commis-
sioner on Human Rights. 
 100. The Security Council is not required to act in any instance.  
MALANCZUK, supra note 11, at 427.  Nor is it required to give any basis for its 
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ing that there were no reasonable alternatives, and that force 
actually would be effective in achieving the desired outcome or 
goal.101  Such a document could be styled as findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, as used in the U.S. legal system.  This “opin-
ion” could be required for all uses of force within and without 
formal Security Council control, such as where the Security 
Council authorizes a coalition of member nations to use force, as 
in the 1991 Gulf War;102 where the Security Council has not par-
ticipated at all, as in the 1999 NATO air strikes in the former 
Yugoslavia;103 where the Security Council has not authorized 
force, as in the 2003 invasion of Iraq;104 or, where a nation acts 
under a claim of self-defense, as in the U.S.-led invasion of Af-
ghanistan in 2001.105  Such a document could be required even 
after the fact, if time constraints made it impossible or unduly 
burdensome to write it before force was used.  This process 
would provide at least some oversight and create examples for 
future reference.  
Added to all of the tasks of the Security Council or other deci-
sionmakers could be the encouragement or even requirement to 
  
reasoning in a particular situation, as it is a political, not a judicial, body.  
DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 207, 282, 304–08.   
 101. Effectiveness is part of the determination of necessity.  Lobel, supra 
note 12, at 554. 
 102. See S.C.Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/678 (1990).  
Authoriz[ing] Member States co-operating with the Government of 
Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991, fully implements, 
as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing resolutions, to use all 
necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 [requiring 
Iraqi forces to withdraw from Kuwait] and all subsequent relevant 
resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the 
area. 
Id.   
 103. White, supra note 12, at 41–42. 
 104. Although the Security Council did not authorize the U.S.-U.K. invasion 
of Iraq, the Security Council has not made an authoritative statement or 
passed a resolution declaring whether the invasion violated the UN Charter 
or other international law.  
 105. The Security Council did not specifically authorize military action 
against Afghanistan following the attacks of September 11, 2001.  Nor did it 
declare that the U.S.-led coalition violated the UN Charter when it invaded 
that country.  See  S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).   
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use “creative problem solving,” a method of problem-solving 
where one defines the problem, generates a wide variety of pos-
sible solutions and then, using reason and experience, chooses 
the best among them.106  A characteristic of competent problem-
solving (as well as critical thinking) is asking the right ques-
tions.107  For example, in generating solutions, one might re-
peatedly ask, “What else might we do here?”  To guide that in-
quiry, one might also ask, “How can we see this problem as an 
opportunity to address the needs of a wide spectrum of people 
and constituencies?”  To generate answers, one would use an 
array of thinking techniques and methods, both traditional and 
innovative, all of which can be taught and learned.108  It may be 
difficult to come up with alternatives to force, but it is possible, 
especially if many people with relevant and broad experience 
are included in the process. 
  
 106. “Creative Problem Solving,” which employs this method, is a growing 
movement in U.S. legal education and beyond.  This method has been de-
scribed as follows: 
Creative problem solving is an evolving intellectual discipline that 
requires lawyers to define problems so as to permit the broadest pos-
sible array of solutions, both legal and non-legal.  Creative problem 
solving seeks many points of view, and systematically examines prob-
lems for their relational implications at the individual, institutional 
and societal levels.  It seeks a caring approach and solutions that are 
imaginative or transformative in nature. 
Creative Problem Solving Offers Hope…and Solutions, RES ISPA:  THE 
MAGAZINE OF CALIFORNIA WESTERN SCHOOL OF LAW, at 2 (Winter 1999) (quot-
ing Janeen Kerper, Professor and Academic Director, McGill Center for Crea-
tive Problem Solving, California Western School of Law, San Diego, Califor-
nia).  The following is a step-by-step description of creative problem solving 
from a workbook that teaches the process: Exploring the Problem; Establish-
ing Goals; Generating Ideas; Choosing the Solution; Implementing the Solu-
tion; Evaluating the Solution.  ROBERT A. HARRIS, CREATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING: 
A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH (2002).  
 107. See HARRIS, supra note 106, at 37–46.  See also JOSINA M. MAKAU & 
DEBIAN L. MARTY, COOPERATIVE ARGUMENTATION: A MODEL FOR DELIBERATIVE 
COMMUNITY 16–18 (2001) (importance of questioning to critical thinking). 
 108. See generally e.g., JAMES L. ADAMS, CONCEPTUAL BLOCKBUSTING: A 
GUIDE TO BETTER IDEAS 1–3 (1985 3d ed.); EDWARD DE BONO, DE BONO’S 
THINKING COURSE (1985).  These are but two of some of the outstanding lead-
ers, and books, in the field.  The Security Council could be trained to use such 
techniques.  Such training is in fact regularly provided by consultants to high 
level management of large corporations and other institutions, particularly 
elite ones.  See Jay Cocks, Let’s Get Crazy!: Creativity is the Buzz Word as 
Companies Try to Spark Daring New Ideas, TIME, June 11, 1990, at 40. 
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The following are examples of questions that decisionmakers 
could be required to ask and answer when they are considering 
whether the use of force is necessary: 
Defining the problem:  
(1) What is the threat or harm to be limited?   
(2) What is/are the precise goal(s), and what value(s) are 
sought to be achieved and vindicated? 
Process:  
(3) What cognitive techniques or methods can we use to find 
possible solutions? 
(4) Who outside of the decision-making group should be in-
volved in this search for alternatives? 
(5) What facts are needed? 
(6) What are some possible solutions? Will they work? 
Why/why not?  
Effectiveness:  
(7) What are the best ways to achieve the goal and vindicate 
the value?  (Attitude is important.  For example, the question 
is not, “Can we use force?” but, “Must we resort to force, and 
how can we avoid using force?”  
(8) What are the short term costs and benefits of each possible 
solution? Are there ways to increase benefits and limit costs?  
Will our goal be met in the short run?  The short term can be 
broken into specific terms: one week, one month, two months, 
etc. 
(9) What are the long term costs and benefits of each possible 
solution? Are there ways to increase benefits and limit costs?  
Will our goal be met in the long run?  The long term can be 
broken into specific terms: six months, one year, two years, 
etc. 
(10) What is the likely response by the target nation?  Will the 
nation fight back? If it fights back, will it respond with force — 
conventional or “asymmetrical,” i.e., terrorism?  Is the target 
allied with other forces that might fight back regardless of the 
response by the target, thus increasing overall violence? 
Of course, these questions can be refined, but should serve as 
starting points for reform.  Some of these questions may be un-
answerable to a reasonable degree of certainty in some situa-
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tions.  Finding answers will be more likely if the Security Coun-
cil’s ability to conduct fact-finding in given instances is im-
proved.109  Before discussing further how to implement this set 
of questions into the Security Council’s decision-making proc-
ess, this Article turns to reforming Step Three.   
B. Reforming Step Three, Limiting Harm 
1. Problem: Bad Timing — Step Three Fails 
to Protect Against Likely Harms 
There is a temporal gap between the jus ad bellum, the law 
on when a nation or the UN may resort to force, and the jus in 
bello, the law on how a nation or the UN may use force, that is, 
how it may conduct a war.110  In other words, Steps One and 
Two are taken before force is used, and Step Three is not taken 
until force is being used.  This gap can be deadly.  Military 
strategies, weapons and tactics are often developed and imple-
mented before a decision has been reached as to whether they 
are legal (in the jus in bello).111  Moreover, the legality and prac-
tical effects of new developments in weapons or strategy are not 
considered as part of the decision of whether to authorize 
force.112  For example, Resolution 678 authorized Member Na-
tions to use “all necessary means” to eject Iraqi troops from 
Kuwait in the 1991 Gulf War.113  The Security Council appears 
to have been unaware of the coalition’s plans to target civilian 
water purification plants and the electrical grid in Iraq, argua-
  
 109. John Quigley, Security Council Fact-finding: A Prerequisite to Effective 
Prevention of War, 7 FL. J. INT’L L. 191, 193 (1992) (arguing that “the Security 
Council’s fact-finding capability is inadequate, and that more active fact-
finding is needed so that the Council can make rational decisions about 
breach of the peace complaints.”). 
 110. See Gardam, Proportionality and Force, supra note 5, at 397. 
 111. Gardam, Noncombatant Immunity, supra note 94, at 836 (“This is not 
unusual for the law of armed conflict, where its provisions always lag behind 
new developments in warfare.  As soon as one method of warfare is regulated, 
another is revealed.”); Schmitt, Bellum Americanum Revisited, supra note 33, 
at 418–19 (2003) (considering “cyber operations” as an example of a rapidly 
evolving technology which may be used militarily although the legality of such 
practices is yet to be determined).   
 112. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39–42. 
 113. U.N. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990). 
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bly an attack on Iraqi civilians violating the jus in bello.114  The 
Security Council may also have been unaware of the likely ex-
tent of civilian casualties.115  Planners believed that 2,000 would 
perish, 116 when by some counts, many times that number were 
killed.117  After the war, the Security Council was silent about 
the extent of this destruction in Iraq, which was arguably not 
“necessary” to the process of ejecting Iraqi troops from Ku-
wait.118 
The law concerning the decision to use force also neglects to 
address other, non-military harms that can occur as a result of 
war planning.119  For example, knowledge that the U.S. would 
attack Afghanistan after September 11, 2001 led many Af-
ghanis to flee to the mountains where they lived in refugee 
camps and risked starvation.120  Additionally, in preparation for 
that war, U.S. officials cut deals with various nations for fly-
over and basing rights; some of these nations, such as Uzbeki-
stan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, were already notorious 
  
 114. See, e.g., Quigley, New Order, supra note 12, at 19 n.112 (1992) (argu-
ing that these attacks violated Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts, which prohibits “an attack which may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or 
a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated”). See also Gardam, Proportionality 
and Force, supra note 5, at 404 (“[m]any of the decisions involving the applica-
tion of proportionality would have been taken at the planning stage of the 
campaign” in the Gulf War). 
 115. Quigley, New Order, supra note 12, at 19 (arguing that “the damage to 
civilian objectives as assessed by the UN team was too extensive to be excused 
as inevitable damages incidental to lawful targeting”). 
 116. Id. at 19 n.112 (citing BOB WOODWARD, THE COMMANDERS 341 (1991)). 
 117. The number of Iraqi civilians killed in the Gulf War is notoriously hard 
to pin down.  Estimates of the number of civilians killed ranged from 5,000 – 
15,000 during the war, and 4,000–6,000 afterward, from lack of medical care 
for wounds or malnutrition.  George Lopez, The Gulf War: Not so Clean, 47 
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 7 (Sept. 1991).  CNN.com, in its “Gulf 
War Facts,” notes simply that “[a]ccording to Baghdad, civilian casualties 
numbered more than 35,000,” at http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/gulf. 
war/facts/gulfwar/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2003).  
 118. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/678 (1990).  See Quigley, New Order, supra note 12, at 19. 
 119. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39–42. 
 120. Mass Migration from Afghanistan, S. F. CHRONICLE, Sept. 25, 2001, at 
A1 (“A U.N. official called the mass migration within Afghanistan and across 
its borders ‘the worst humanitarian crisis in the world.’”). 
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abusers of human rights.121  In some cases the presence of U.S. 
and other foreign troops exacerbated the risk of protests and 
resistance among citizens, which led leaders to further repress 
their populaces.122  The law of war should address such conse-
quences of war-planning.  
Another limitation of the jus in bello is that, in general, these 
rules are enforced by the belligerents themselves, as there is 
generally no third party to referee the fighting.  International 
control, if any, comes later, in the form of war crimes tribu-
nals.123  However, such tribunals are rare, and those who commit 
war crimes often go unpunished.124  Prosecution is also selective.  
For example, it is unlikely that there will be international tri-
bunals to try U.S. soldiers for alleged war crimes in Afghani-
stan or Iraq.125  Indeed, U.S. leaders fought against the efforts of 
other nations to include U.S. military personnel and political 
leaders under the jurisdiction of a new, permanent interna-
tional tribunal, the International Criminal Court, which came 
into effect on July 1, 2002 and which has jurisdiction over war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.126 
  
 121. America’s Central Asian Allies, N.Y. TIMES (editorial), Oct. 2, 2001, at 
A24.  These are rights that the UN Security Council can simply require, but 
for which a nation acting unilaterally must negotiate.  U.N. CHARTER art. 43, 
para. 1.   
 122. See For Whom the Liberty Bell Tolls, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 31–Sept. 6, 
2002, at 18 (detailing widespread reduction (legitimate and illegitimate) of 
human rights by governments worldwide under the color of anti-terrorism 
after September 11, 2001).  See also Nick Paton Walsh, US Looks Away as 
New Ally Tortures Islamists: Uzbekistan’s President Steps up Repression of 
Opponents, THE GUARDIAN (London), May 26, 2003, at 13; Craig Skehan, Af-
ghan War Sparks New Repression In Kyrgyzstan, THE AGE (Melbourne), Sept. 
28, 2002, at 18. 
 123. Bassiouni, supra note 7, at 9, 18 (arguing that this post hoc justice can 
have a deterrent effect, which can help “the pursuit of peace”).  
 124. Id. at 11.    
 125. For example, no international tribunal has been formed concerning an 
alleged atrocity that may have involved U.S. and Northern Alliance soldiers. 
Babak Dehghanpisheh et al., The Death Convoy of Afghanistan, NEWSWEEK, 
Aug. 26, 2002, at 20.  An international forum is not only important to vindi-
cate the rights of victims, but it is also important to vindicate soldiers, and 
their sponsoring nation, who may have been wrongly accused of a war crime. 
 126. For a sometimes humorous account of the U.S. antipathy toward the 
ICC, see Lauren Comiteau, The International Criminal Court: In Dutch with 
America, CHIC. TRIB., July 22, 2002, at C1. 
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Finally, because international control over war-planning is 
lacking, there is a risk in the case of self-defense that national 
leaders will be ill-equipped to decide whether to apply force, 
because they lack both perspective and information.  For exam-
ple, according to an ICJ opinion, the proportionality require-
ment for self-defense may be interpreted to permit the use of 
nuclear weapons “in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in 
which the very survival of a State would be at stake.”127  But 
how “extreme” must the circumstances be?  That is, what would 
count as threatening “the very survival of a State”?  There is a 
risk that national leaders might overcompensate in the fog and 
stress of an attack.128 
2. A Solution: Requiring Decisionmakers to Consider Likely 
Harms, and Ways to Prevent or Limit Them, as Part 
of the Determination of Whether to Authorize Force 
How decisionmakers intend to use force should be considered 
in determining whether they may legally use force.  One possi-
ble reform is for the Security Council to consider the proposed 
military strategy as part of its decision of whether to authorize 
force.  The Security Council should explore specific ways to 
avoid or limit the likely harms that will result from the plan 
and then require such protective measures.129  This is primarily 
a change in timing.  Instead of maintaining the separation of 
jus ad bellum and jus in bello concerns, international law 
should seek to develop a more fluid approach.  This approach 
would be more realistic, given that some of the harms that the 
jus in bello seeks to prevent may have already occurred before 
the jus in bello is addressed, as described in the previous sec-
tion.130 
  
 127. Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
1996 I.C.J. 226, 227, 263, 266 (July 8).  
 128. See BROWNLIE, supra note 70, at 436 (“There is…great agreement and 
community of interest behind the proposition that, in the era of nuclear and 
thermonuclear armament, self-help involves intolerable risks.”). 
 129. Secrecy of plans should not be a concern: the Security Council is capa-
ble of meeting in secret, if necessary.  O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense, supra 
note 4, at 908 n.117.  
 130. See supra Part III.B.1.  Notably, the Independent International Com-
mission on Kosovo, in its proposed principles for assessing the legitimacy of 
humanitarian interventions, suggests that the principles may be “applied 
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The following are some questions that decisionmakers should 
be required to ask in determining whether force can be used 
legally.  These questions address harms that result directly and 
immediately from the decision to use force, falling within the 
gap between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello: 
General: 
(1) What are the likely civilian casualties, and can they be lim-
ited? 
(2) What are the likely military casualties on both sides, and 
can they be limited? This criterion should recognize that com-
batants are often conscripts. 
(3) Will there be a meaningful chance for soldiers to surrender 
before any opening salvos? 
Weaponry:  
(4) What are the short term and long term medical effects of 
the weapons being used?  Will weapons create danger in the 
conflict theater long after hostilities end, as is the case with 
depleted uranium and unexploded cluster bombs and land 
mines? 
“Conflict contagion”131: 
(5) What is the likelihood that a proposed conflict will esca-




either before an intervention in order to determine whether force should be 
used, or [afterward] to assess whether an intervention was justifiable.”  
INDEPENDENT INT’L COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT, 
INT’L RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 193 (Oxford University Press 2000).  One 
such principle is that “[t]here must be even stricter adherence to the laws of 
war and international humanitarian law than in standard military opera-
tions.  This applies to all aspects of the military operation, including any post 
cease-fire occupation.”  Id. at 195.  Such a heightened adherence to these laws 
is in keeping with the rationale behind intervention, which is to protect a 
civilian population.  That said, it can certainly be argued that civilian popula-
tions should be shown such concern whatever the reason force is used. 
 131. See Carl Conetta, “Operation Enduring Freedom: Why a Higher Rate of 
Civilian Bombing Casualties?” Cambridge, MA: Commonwealth Institute, 
Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Report #11, 18 Jan. 2002 (revised 
Jan. 24, 2002), at http://www.comw.org/pda/0201oef.html. 
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(6) Will the use of force have a negative effect on human rights 
of people in combatant and neighboring nations?  Is there 
likely to be repression by these governments? 
(7) Will the conflict touch off humanitarian crises such as 
refugees and starvation?  Will the destruction of military or 
“dual use” civilian/military targets (such as electrical grids 
and water treatment plants) also affect the lives of civilians? 
Economics: 
(8) How will the conflict affect the economies of various na-
tions, and of the world?  What will the effect be on world mar-
kets, such as stock exchanges or oil markets? 
International peace and security: 
(9) Will the government of the targeted nation be changed as a 
result of the use of force against it?  What kind of government 
will replace it?  What will be the resulting effects on interna-
tional peace, security, and human rights?  
(10) With respect to rebuilding conflict zones, what types of 
weaponry will be used?  Will dangers from these weapons per-
sist for civilians and builders after the war?  Will important 
infrastructure be targeted?  Is there a rebuilding plan?  Will 
the war result in chaos, creating humanitarian disasters or an 
environment conducive to terrorism?  
Development and respect for international law: 
(11) What precedent will the use of force in this case yield? 
(12) Balancing of harms: How will these harms be balanced 
against the goal that the use of force meant to achieve? 
A dynamic could come into play: by being forced to consider in 
advance the likely harms and costs associated with the use of 
force, and, where possible, to make these considerations public, 
planners proposing to use force could see that option as less and 
less attractive.  There might be increased public pressure on 
leaders to avoid these costs and, ultimately, to avoid the use of 
force.132 
This Article now turns to implementing the recommended re-
forms of Steps Two and Three. 
  
 132. Indeed, national laws requiring leaders to consider these costs could be 
proposed.  See infra Part IV.E.  
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IV. BEYOND LEGAL REFORM: IMPLEMENTING THESE PROPOSALS 
THROUGH IMPROVED PRACTICES 
One way to make these changes part of international law 
would be to include the series of questions set forth above in the 
UN Charter, perhaps as commentary or in an appendix.133  Of 
course, such a change might be difficult to effect.  Nevertheless, 
there are ways to implement these proposals through less for-
mal changes in practice.  For example, political pressure could 
lead the Security Council to articulate its decision concerning 
the use of force.  Such pressure can also be enhanced by initia-
tives from other entities such as the General Assembly, ICJ, 
NGOs, scholars in universities and think tanks, and the public.  
Also, changes in U.S. and other nations’ laws can help protect 
some of the interests that this Article seeks to protect under 
international law. 
A. Rethinking Security Council Practice 
There are many ways as a practical matter that the Security 
Council could improve its search for alternatives to force as well 
as its consideration of ways to prevent or limit harms likely to 
result from any use of force.  It could voluntarily adopt the 
process and questions set forth above.134  As part of this process, 
the Security Council could continue its trend of working with 
outside experts, which could help it find alternatives to force.  
In various other matters, the Security Council encourages such 
participation.  For example, since 1995, the NGO Working 
Group on the Security Council, a group of about 30 representa-
tives from NGOs such as Amnesty International, CARE, and 
Oxfam, has endeavored to build informal relationships with 
members of the Security Council. 135  This involvement is a step 
  
 133. See, e.g., GRENVILLE CLARK & LOUIS B. SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH 
WORLD LAW  (Harvard University 1958) (proposing a revised UN Charter, 
which would include detailed commentary and “annexes”). 
 134. See supra Parts III.A.4. and III.B.2. 
 135. NGO Working Group on the Security Council Information Statement, 
at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/ngowkgrp/statements/current.htm (last 
visited Sept. 2, 2003) (noting that “Council members have found that NGOs 
can provide exceedingly valuable field information from their contacts in crisis 
areas, helping to improve their delegations’ awareness of the issues and con-
tributing to the Council’s policy-making process.  In many cases, NGOs may 
even be directly involved in UN field programs.”).  Information about the NGO 
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in the right direction.  With the weight and eyes of the world 
upon it, the Security Council should welcome such input.   
Yet, that grave weight also encourages secrecy, which can 
hamper another way to improve the Security Council’s consid-
eration of alternatives to force and of ways to prevent the likely 
harms that force can cause: transparency.  Much of the work of 
the Security Council already takes place behind closed doors, 
especially among the Permanent Five Members (China, France, 
Russia, the U.K. and the U.S.).136  Greater transparency would 
likely encourage the inquiry and debate that can lead to better 
ideas.  Transparency and openness can discipline decision-
making by encouraging those involved to adhere to principles of 
reason and equity  As groups such as Human Rights Watch 
suggest, it is easier to ignore human rights when no one is look-
ing.137  Thus, the time has come to reform current Security 
Council and UN rules and practice to encourage inclusiveness 
and openness when possible.138 
As pointed out above, the Security Council could be required 
to produce a document discussing alternatives to force and 
evaluating the likelihood of success of each alternative.  Thus, 
the range of the search could be seen, and specious, tendentious 
arguments exposed.139  Such attention should be required be-
cause few decisions are graver or more worthy of discussion 
  
Working Group on the Security Council can be found on the Global Policy 
Forum website at www.globalpolicy.org (last visited Aug. 21, 2002). 
 136. MALANCZUK, supra note 11, at 376–77 (noting the “lack of transparency 
of the decisionmaking by the P5…or P3 (the Western powers which often hold 
meetings in secret, following which only the formal votes become part of the 
public record)”).  
 137. Information about Human Rights Watch can be found on the Human 
Rights Watch website at http://www.hrw.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2003). 
 138. Of course, if it is being led in creative problem solving exercises, pri-
vacy might be required, as some of these exercises promote a wide-ranging 
search for answers that permits introduction of possibly silly or outlandish 
ideas as a way of arriving at practical ideas.  See e.g., Adams, supra note 108, 
at 134–37 (describing group “brainstorming” exercise and its requirement to 
come up with many “wild” ideas). 
 139. See BROWNLIE, supra note 70, at 436 (“In attempting to provide effec-
tive legal controls the jurist must concentrate on the immediate source of 
danger — the use of force — and characterize the conditions in which it is 
prohibited in such a way that states can only give justifications for their ille-
gal acts in terms of considerable implausibility.”). 
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than whether to unleash a modern war-making machine, which 
produces death, refugees and other crises. 
B. Rethinking General Assembly Practice 
If the Security Council will not conduct an inquiry regarding 
the necessity of using force and ways to limit the attendant 
harms in a given case, then the General Assembly should do so 
instead.  The Security Council has “primary” but not exclusive 
responsibility for matters concerning international peace and 
security.140  If the Security Council fails to act, the General As-
sembly may thus exercise a secondary authority, making non-
binding recommendations to nations.141  There is nothing to stop 
the General Assembly from working with experts, activists and 
scholars to find alternatives to force in impending conflicts, 
which could pressure the Security Council to justify its deci-
sions.  The General Assembly could produce a “brief” or “opin-
ion” as described above142 to make sure that the questions set 
forth above are asked and answered.143  In addition, the General 
Assembly could proactively initiate UN focus on looming prob-
lems that could, if left to fester, endanger international peace 
and security.  
C. Rethinking International Court of Justice Practice 
A more active use of the ICJ144 by UN member nations has the 
potential to provide guidance for the development of the jus ad 
bellum.  Member nations could initiate claims for damages in 
  
 140. UN Charter, art. 24, para. 1.  See also Nigel. D. White, The Legality of 
Bombing in the Name of Humanity, 5  J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 27, 41–2 (2000). 
 141. See Schachter, supra note 16, at 1622.  
The General Assembly, which may decide important questions by a 
two-thirds majority, has on occasion adopted decisions that involve 
judgments on the use of force.  These decisions are not binding under 
the Charter.  That does not mean that they lack ‘authority,’ for at 
least in some cases such resolutions will be regarded as expressing 
the ‘general will’ of the international community and as persuasive 
evidence of legal obligation. 
Id.  See generally Schachter, Alf Ross Memorial Lecture: The Crisis of Legiti-
mation in the United Nations, 50 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR INT’L. RET. 3 (1981).  
 142. See supra Parts III.A.4. and IV.A. 
 143. See supra Parts III.A.4. and III.B.2. 
 144. U.N. CHARTER art. 92. 
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the ICJ concerning particular, actual uses of force.  Non-
combatant nations that are indirectly affected by a particular 
use of force (such as by suffering economic or environmental 
damage) could develop legal theories on which to base claims for 
damages.  Such actions would help create legal doctrines and 
potentially prevent future uses of force.145  Individuals, busi-
nesses and other entities that are not entitled to bring cases 
under ICJ jurisdiction could file similar claims in other courts 
with international jurisdiction.  Also, it remains to be seen how 
practice before the new International Criminal Court will take 
shape, but prosecution for war crimes — especially of leaders 
who violate the jus ad bellum — could be a promising way to 
clarify and develop this law.   
The ICJ offers the potential for prospective guidance, too.  
The General Assembly or qualified UN organizations could flex 
their muscles under Article 96146 to request that the ICJ issue 
an advisory opinion in certain instances. 147  Indeed, the ICJ has 
shown that it can conduct thorough inquiries concerning the 
legality of the use of force.148  In advisory opinions, questions can 
be framed more broadly than the question a particular member 
nation may pose in the context of an actual claim for damages.  
For example, in 1996, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion in re-
sponse to a General Assembly request, which the ICJ framed as 
follows: “Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circum-
stance permitted under international law?”149  The advantage of 
  
 145. GRAY, supra note 9, at 11–12 (noting the potential of the International 
Court of Justice to clarify the laws on “this sensitive subject matter of the use 
of force” as states increasingly bring claims before it). 
 146. U.N. CHARTER art. 96, para. 1. 
 147. The General Assembly may “authorize other UN organs or specialized 
agencies to request advisory opinions on ‘legal questions arising within the 
scope of their activities.’” Advisory opinions are not legally binding but none-
theless have substantial persuasive value.” JEFFERY L. DUNOFF, ET. AL., 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS ACTORS, PROCESS 69 (2002).  See also, U.N. 
CHARTER art. 96. 
 148. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 14 (June 27). 
 149. Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
1996 I.C.J. 226, 228 (July 8).  This question was originally, “Is the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international 
law?  [Est-il permis en droit international de recourir a la menace ou a l’em-
ploi d’armes nucleaire en toute circonstance?]”  UN GA Res. 49/75K (Dec. 15, 
1994).  This question was not novel: The General Assembly passed a reso-
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the advisory opinion here is obvious: no nation had to wait to be 
attacked by nuclear weapons before raising the question.  Per-
haps similar questions could be framed by the General Assem-
bly regarding what could be considered, in light of September 
11, pressing international legal issues: whether the use of mili-
tary force to topple the governments of “terrorist nations” is le-
gal, and under what circumstances would it be legal to use force 
in response to terrorist attacks?  Obviously, great care would be 
needed to frame such a question, but seeking an advisory opin-
ion is a viable way of challenging the increased and increasing 
readiness of various nations to use (and perhaps abuse) force in 
this way.  A similar question could be framed regarding under 
what circumstances the use of force would be a legitimate 
method of countering the proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction.  
One can also imagine a country that feared an attack, per-
haps a preemptive strike to destroy actual or alleged weapons of 
mass destruction,150 asking the ICJ for a provisional ruling on 
the legality of such an attack.151  Even if the ICJ ultimately re-
  
lution in 1961 declaring nuclear weapons illegal, and the request for the advi-
sory opinion from the ICJ was originally brought in 1993 by the WHO.  See 
MALANCZUK, supra note 11, at 346–50.  
 150. Such as the 2003 U.S.-U.K. war against Iraq.  Further wars are likely, 
given the National Security Strategy published by the Bush Administration in 
2002, which claims that the U.S. has a right to wage such wars as a counter-
proliferation measure.  The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America, Chapter V, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2003). 
 151. The ICJ entertained and ultimately rejected a claim by Libya for provi-
sional measures to prevent a feared attack or embargo by the U.S. for refusing 
to extradite two Libyan nationals suspected of bombing Pan Am Flight 103 
over Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1989, which killed over 250 people.  
Libya claimed that it was exercising its rights pursuant to the 1971 Montreal 
Convention on terrorism against aircraft. Between the time of Libya’s filing 
for provisional measures and the Court’s decision, the Security Council set 
forth a Resolution requiring extradition.  The Court rejected Libya’s request 
for provisional measures and held that in this instance the Security Council 
Resolution had to be followed, but added that it was “not at this stage called 
upon to determine definitively the legal effect of Security Council resolution 
748 (1992).”  Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of 
the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie 
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114, 126–27 (Apr. 14).  As such, 
the case leaves open the possibility of a sort of “judicial review” of Security 
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jected such a move, the nation fearing attack could benefit from 
making its case in this forum so that alternatives and likely 
harms might be considered, which in turn might erode interna-
tional support for the attack. 
D. Rethinking Practices of NGOs, Scholars, and the Public to 
Promote Better Thinking About Using Force and to Pressure 
Decisionmakers to do the Same 
In lieu of, or in addition to, these efforts by UN organs, inter-
ested experts, activists and scholars should step up their own 
efforts to generate and publish alternatives to using force, and 
generate popular support by showing the common benefits that 
will accrue to all nations.  Such ideas should be published 
widely, including in times of peace, because once an attack oc-
curs or a crisis unfolds, individuals who oppose military action 
are often asked, “If you oppose war, then what do you suggest 
instead?” and, “Are you saying we should do nothing?”  A popu-
lation responding to an attack (and fearing further attacks) is, 
understandably, not in a calm and deliberative mood.  The law 
must take this reality into account.  Ideally, leaders and experts 
would be able to point to concrete alternatives to war that could 
likely prove less costly and more effective in achieving the de-
sired goal in a time of crisis.152 
Ultimately, one way or another, governments respond to their 
people.  If problems are capable of solutions less costly than 
war, and those solutions are published widely, reasonable pub-
lics would demand that they be tried.  Shining light on the deci-
sion-making process, challenging decisionmakers to be smarter 
and more creative, and publicly judging them on these qualities 
  
Council resolutions, a power which — if it exists — could help develop the law 
of war. See GRAY, supra note 9, at 10. 
 152. Few alternatives to force were published after the September 11 at-
tacks.  For a comprehensive explanation of the problems with Operation En-
during Freedom and its ineffectiveness in defeating the threat of Al Qaeda, as 
well as an alternative approach, see CARL CONETTA, COMMONWEALTH 
INSTITUTE PROJECT ON DEFENSE ALTERNATIVES RESEARCH MONOGRAPH 6, 
STRANGE VICTORY: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM 
AND THE AFGHANISTAN WAR (Cambridge, MA, Jan. 30, 2002), available at 
http://www.comw.org/pda/0201strangevic.pdf.   
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could increase their incentive to find, and try, peaceful op-
tions.153 
E. Rethinking National Law to Limit Nations’ Resort to Force  
A nation’s people are the ones who must fight, be killed and 
maimed, and suffer from the wars initiated by their leaders, so 
it is the people who must be persuaded to support a war.  One 
possibility of limiting the use of force thus rests with the people 
of particular nations.154   
Legally requiring national leaders to justify any conclusion 
that force is necessary and to show how they will limit likely 
harms and costs would be a giant step in limiting the recourse 
to military force.  Currently, these matters are not part of the 
public discourse.155  Reformers, however, could propose a law, 
entitled, “The Responsible Use of Military Force in Interna-
tional Affairs” (RUMFIA), codifying this idea and making it a 
part of the public discourse.  Politicians could rally around this 
proposal as a way of protecting U.S. servicemen and women, 
  
 153. For a discussion of the role of the populace in determining the appro-
priateness of the use of force, see generally DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Charlotte Ku & Harold K. Jacob-
son eds., 2002) (concluding that “national-level mechanisms” have been most 
important in assuring democratic accountability of national and international 
decisionmakers in deploying forces under NATO and UN authority) [hereinaf-
ter DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY].  Public observation of the Security Council 
deliberations in the run up to the U.S. war against Iraq earlier this year could 
accelerate changes in Security Council practice.  Brian J. Foley, Recent (Inde-
cent) Exposures: Impact on International Law of U.S. Policies Toward Iraq 
and North Korea, PROCEEDINGS, U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY AND COUNTERPRO- 
LIFERATION 26 (Feb. 26 2003, sponsored by Center for Defense Information 
and Physicians for Social Responsibility), available at http://www.lawyersagai 
nstthewar.org/legalarticles/foleyexposure.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2003). 
 154. DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 153, at 65.  
 155. See Ruth Wedgewood, Implementing Limitations on the Use of Force: 
The Doctrines of Necessity and Proportionality, 86 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 39, 
58 (1992). 
Proportionality and necessity have been segregated from American 
public policy debate, cabined as technical military doctrines to be 
handled by the war colleges and Pentagon staff.  My claim here today 
is that proportionality and necessity belong at the center of civilian 
debate on the use of force in foreign affairs. 
Id. 
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citizens, and people in other countries,156 and of fostering inter-
national stability. 
There may be popular support for such a measure.  A large, 
worldwide, antiwar movement sprang up in opposition to the 
U.S. war against Iraq during its planning stages.157  Even if such 
support could not succeed in passing RUMFIA, a movement’s 
merely drafting it and campaigning for its adoption would focus 
public attention on these issues.  For example, most U.S. citi-
zens are probably unaware of the extent of death and damage 
caused by the 1991 Gulf War or the invasions of Afghanistan 
and Iraq.158  As more accurate and timely information about the 
actual effects of war becomes readily available, a movement to 
ensure that the decision to use force includes consideration of 
these harms could gain popular support.   
The recent debate over whether to go to war against Iraq ex-
emplifies the need for more national focus on alternatives to 
war and the precise harms that could result from waging war.  
At the end of July and the beginning of August 2002, the Senate 
  
 156. See id., at 59 (comments by Professor Ruth Wedgwood: “Strategic pro-
portionality asks that civilian casualties be weighed against the justification 
for using force in the first place.”). 
 157. Patrick E. Tyler, A New Power in the Streets, N.Y. TIMES, February 17, 
2003, at A1. 
 158. For an example of the ideological sparring in the U.S. media concern-
ing the numbers of civilians killed in U.S. military actions, see John Leo, The 
Truth About Casualties, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 31, 2003, at 3 (ex-
pressing skepticism that the number of dead in Iraq would turn out as high as 
initial reports: “In a number-obsessed society, focusing relentlessly on the 
deaths of innocents — and inflating the numbers, if necessary — is a conven-
tional way of undermining support for war.”).  The corollary would appear to 
obtain as well: underreporting the deaths of innocents is a conventional way of 
creating and maintaining support for war.  Regarding U.S. media coverage of 
the war against Afghanistan, see Neil Hickey, A Time of Testing: Special Re-
port, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 40 (calling Pentagon’s rules 
limiting journalists as “toughest ever”); Michael Massing, Grief Without Por-
traits, THE NATION, Feb. 4, 2002, at 6 (discussing lack of media reporting on 
non-U.S. casualties of war); Patrick McCormick, See No Evil: While Movie 
Wars are Raging on Screens Across the Nation, Uncle Sam has Managed to 
Keep Both Media and Citizens in the Dark About the Ugly Reality of Our Real-
Life War on Terror, U.S. CATHOLIC, July 1, 2002, at 46.  The failure of the me-
dia to highlight the horrors of war is by no means a new phenomenon, nor is it 
limited to U.S. media, as the previous citations may appear to suggest.  See 
generally PHILLIP KNIGHTLY, THE FIRST CASUALTY: THE WAR CORRESPONDENT 
AS HERO AND MYTH-MAKER FROM THE CRIMEA TO KOSOVO (2000). 
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Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings on the need for a 
war against Iraq.159  These hearings, however, considered only a 
few of the likely harms set forth above.  There was little or no 
focus on likely civilian casualties, casualties among conscripted 
Iraqi soldiers, or human rights deprivations that could result in 
other nations if their leaders supported the war against the 
wishes of their populaces or insurgent factions.160  There was no 
meaningful discussion of possible alternatives to the use of force 
and violence.161  Finally, the Congressional debate that led to the 
resolution allowing President Bush to use of force to invade Iraq 
did not highlight these concerns.162 
In addition, a movement to pass such a law could have a 
beneficial effect on U.S. international relations.  This move-
ment, and any resulting law, could enhance American moral 
authority, arguably the real source of power, whether national 
or international.163   
Likewise, people in other nations could seek to limit their 
own governments’ use of force, and their own governments’ 
support for other nations’ military actions.  For example, citi-
zens of democratic nations, especially those on the Security 
Council, could demand laws to prohibit their governments’ sup-
port for other nations’ military ventures unless the questions 
set forth above in Section III164 or similar questions are an-
swered satisfactorily.   
These issues could also be aired through court challenges to 
the national authority to wage war.  For example, five weeks 
before the U.S. and U.K. invaded Iraq in 2003, a motion for a 
preliminary injunction was filed in the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts by members of the House of Rep-
resentatives, military personnel, parents of military personnel, 
  
 159. Hearings to Examine Threats, Responses, and Regional Consideration 
Surrounding Iraq: Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 107th Cong. 
(2002), available at http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/pdf/iraqhear.pdf.  
 160. Id. 
 161. See id. 
 162. Excerpts From Senate Debate on Iraq Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2002, 
at A20;  The House Makes Its Decision: “Let Us Take This Stand Against Ter-
ror,” N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2002, at A14 (excerpts of floor speeches by Democrat 
and Republican leaders).  
 163. JOSEPH S. NYE JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER 8–9 (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2002) (using the term “soft power” for this type of authority). 
 164. See supra Parts III.A.4 and III.B.2. 
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and others to stop President Bush from initiating war.165  The 
court denied the motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit affirmed, holding that it was beyond the court’s 
powers to decide the issue at that time, because it was not clear 
that there was any dispute between President Bush and Con-
gress, or that either governmental branch had done or was 
about to do anything in violation of their constitutional duties 
or other laws.166  Similarly, in the U.K., the Campaign for Nu-
clear Disarmament sued the British government in British 
courts, arguing that the court should  interpret UN Security 
Council Resolution 1441 as not permitting the U.K. (or other 
nations) to use force against Iraq, and as requiring an addi-
tional Security Council Resolution before force could be used.167  
A court dismissed the suit on December 17, 2002, reasoning 
that interpreting a Security Council resolution fell outside the 
court’s jurisdiction.168  These lawsuits, despite failing, brought 
increased attention to the issue of a government’s war-making 
abilities and, in the long run, could play a part in forcing gov-
ernments to use these powers in strict accordance with the law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has been concerned with a very particular reform 
to the international law on the use of force: developing it to 
guide decisionmakers, prospectively, to find alternatives to 
force, and to find ways to prevent or limit the harms that are 
likely from a proposed use of force.  The law on the use of force, 
perhaps more than any other area of law, must provide prospec-
tive guidance, because harms caused by the use of military force 
cannot be undone.  Those killed cannot be “un-killed,” the dis-
membered cannot be “re-membered,” widows cannot be “un-
widowed,” and orphans cannot be “un-orphaned”; indeed, there 
are no such words in the English language.  The use of force, 
regardless of any noble intentions, causes severe harm and dis-
  
 165. Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, reh’g. den., 322 F.3d 109 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 166. Id. at 137–41, 143–44. 
 167. BBC, CND Loses Fight Against War (Dec. 17, 2002), at http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2583207.stm.  The text of the briefs and the court opin-
ion are available at http://www.cnduk.org/pages/campaign/legal. 
tm. 
 168. Id. 
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order.  State-sponsored violence is thus a measure that must be 
used sparingly, and with great discipline and restraint. 
This Article poses questions for decisionmakers to consider 
before permitting the use of force.  These questions should im-
prove the search for alternatives to force and guide decision-
makers to find solutions that avoid or limit the harms caused by 
the use of force.  At times, the answers to these questions may 
lead to the conclusion that force is the best and most effective 
option.  Nevertheless it is hoped that such instances will be 
rare, rarer than they are today.  This Article also raises ques-
tions regarding the clarity of international law on the use of 
force, and about the attitudes and rigor that decisionmakers 
should bring to the task of determining whether to use force in 
a given instance.  This Article has answered these questions 
normatively, by prescribing proposals for reform.  
Beyond question is the fact that international law on the use 
of force will not, on its own, develop into a tool for the sort of 
guidance proposed in this Article.  There is no enforcement 
mechanism, and the emphasis of scholars on state practice and 
custom will often make pronouncements on legality late-coming 
and debatable, perhaps endlessly so.  Moreover, those pro-
nouncements may be ill-suited to prevent future uses of force, 
because circumstances may differ, making any “precedent” in-
applicable.  Indeed, a nation that is entrepreneurial in the use 
of force, and capable of using force without fear of suffering 
damaging responses, can offer various justifications for using 
force, each different from those that came before.  International 
law scholars would trail behind, trying to make sense of the de-
struction, to determine whether, after all, the action was legal, 
while remaining impotent to prevent future damage or to influ-
ence state practice.   
Thus, it is necessary to approach the law of war, and espe-
cially the jus ad bellum, proactively, with a reformer’s attitude.  
International law is nascent, a work-in-progress.  As such, the 
opportunity exists for scholars not merely to describe state 
practice but also to import the best ideas they can find from 
other legal systems, or create themselves, to build a body of law 
that is fair and sensible, and capable of preventing all but the 
most necessary and limited uses of force.  Future generations 
will thank us. 
